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In 2019, 20 years after the launch of the single currency, the euro area
policy framework remains highly debated among politicians, academics,
and citizens. The need to improve this framework had been highlighted by
the widening of imbalances prior to the 2007 financial crisis, and after-
wards by the huge impact of the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis in
Southern European countries, and the Great Recession. The issues under
debate may be divided into four main axes.
An unfinished construction?
The architectures of the European Union (EU) and even more of the
euro area are specific and subject to never-ending changes, with disagree-
ment on the plans among EU architects. 
For federalists, the EU should become a federation that progressively
acquires all the powers and characteristics of a nation. The single market,
the single currency, the monetary union (the European Central Bank,
ECB, the banking union), the fiscal union (the Stability and Growth
Pact, the Fiscal Treaty, the “first European semester”) already exist.
Fiscal EU should be deepened (a federal fiscal policy), as well as the
banking union, the capital markets union, EU diplomacy, social Europe,
European taxation, European defence, etc. There is a need to move
forward, towards greater integration than in current treaties. At each step,
1. This volume brings together a group of papers, following a reviewing process and based on earlier
drafts presented at the 15th EUROFRAME Conference on economic policy issues in the European
Union: “Economic Policies and Political Economy in the EU after the Crisis”, held in Milan (Italy) on
8 June 2018. EUROFRAME is a network of ten independent European research institutes: DIW and IfW
(Germany), ESRI (Ireland), OFCE (France), PROMETEIA (Italy), CPB (Netherlands), WIFO (Austria), ETLA
(Finland), CASE (Poland), and NIESR (United Kingdom). Since 2004, every year in June EUROFRAME
has been organising a Conference on economic policies in the EU. In 2018, 25 papers were presented.
Most of them are available on the Conference web page (http://www.euroframe.org)Revue de l’OFCE, Hors-série (2019)
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through more Europe.
For the proponents of a Europe of Nation-states, the EU should keep an
intergovernmental functioning, and decisions should be made by heads of
government, under the unanimity principle. EU powers and its size should
not be extended. The subsidiarity principle should be respected: decisions
should be made at the lowest possible level, and domestic specificity
should be allowed to remain.
Each of these strategies raises economic and democratic issues. The
federalist strategy does not account for EU countries’ diversity in terms of
economic and social structure. The Member States (MS) are expected to
converge towards a single model, defined through a technocratic process.
According to some, the EU should oblige the MS to converge towards a
neo-liberal economic model, the only model suitable to globalisation.
According to others, the EU should protect the European social model,
with its specificities, its scale of social protection, labour laws, etc. The
Nation-state strategy is not promising. It does not account for interde-
pendencies between the MS. There is a strong contradiction between on
the one hand the single market and the single currency, and on the other
hand domestic structures, be it in terms of wage developments, taxation,
the social system, or industrial policy. In both cases, crucial decisions are
being made at the EU level without democratic debate, without political
choices, either within technocratic federalist circles or through compro-
mises reached by governments. This is what we have seen since the 2007
crisis, with the absence of democratic debates at the EU level on issues such
as financial support for Greece, the Fiscal Treaty and Brexit. 
There are permanent tensions in the euro area between a federalist
ambition (an ever closer Union) and desires to retain or recover domestic
sovereignty (taking back control). These tensions may lead to open or
hidden crises, like Brexit, or some MS’ reluctance to combat tax optimisa-
tion or the refusal of some Central and Eastern European countries to open
their frontiers to migrants. 
A crisis of national cohesions
In addition, in all the advanced economies, national cohesion is being
weakened by technical progress, globalisation, financialisation and migra-
tion. De-industrialisation, robotisation and automation reduce the number
of stable and relatively well-paid jobs for lower- and middle-class workers.
Conversely, a small number of people benefit from financialisation and
globalisation. Wage and income inequalities increase. While social protec-
tion needs grow, the public finances are constrained by tax competition.
Temptations towards protectionism and nationalism mount. The fracture
between the upper class and the rest of the society widens as the lower
Introduction. Economic Policies in the Euro Area after the Crisis 7class loses trust in the elites. This is not a phenomenon specific to the euro
area, as can be seen from Brexit or the election of Donald Trump in the US.
In Europe, this often translates into rejecting European construction. 
Each advanced country (or area) has to choose between two strategies:
strengthening competitiveness and attractiveness, and thereafter relying
on job and wage flexibility to allow the invisible hand to restore a satisfac-
tory equilibrium; or strengthening domestic (or EU) protection, either via
trade policy, industrial policy, or social policy. Moreover, the ecological
constraint requires tough economic decisions. Strategic choices are
particularly hard to make in the EU where the MS are in different situations
and have diverging interests and ways of thinking. So far, the attempt by
French President Emmanuel Macron to promote a “European renaissance”
has faced inertia from some MS and clear hostility from other MS, who
oppose any move towards further European integration. How to make
strong and constructive decisions in these conditions? 
Which rules of functioning?
The euro area does not have satisfactory functioning rules. Fears of
Northern countries about fiscal laxism leads to the introduction of numer-
ical fiscal rules lacking economic rationale, such as the deficit limit of 3% of
GDP and the 60% limit of GDP for public debt, the objective of long-term
public structural balance, or the requirement to reduce the structural
deficit by an annual 0.5% of GDP. The EU Commission and several MS are
refusing to change the rules, although they do not fit the current economic
context. A situation with nominal interest rates at the zero lower bound
was not anticipated. Some level of public deficit and public debts seem
necessary today for the macroeconomic equilibrium. The pre-crisis periods
have shown the need for more precise economic policy coordination; it has
turned out that the tricky points were wage coordination and the compati-
bility of external balances objectives.
Fortunately, the principle of the absence of solidarity between MS as
well as of the ECB not being allowed to buy public bonds have been
forgotten. But more generally speaking, while some progress has been
made, this has not resulted in a coherent architecture. The EU institutions
assess the economic policies implemented in the MS and provide critical
assessments if the latter do not follow EU rules and guidelines, but they do
so on a country-by-country basis, with no real overall coherence. It would
be illusory anyway to try to reach coherence if the MS that have room for
manoeuvre refuse to use it. All in all, the EU can only criticize MS whose
fiscal policy does not follow the predefined rules; but this does not at all
define an overall fiscal and wage strategy.
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but the financial markets increase spreads on long-term interest rates,
punishing fragile countries (such as Italy) and lending at low rates to strong
countries (such as Germany), which exacerbates divergences. This could
be corrected by a macro-prudential policy, which nevertheless conceals an
ambiguity: how to control domestic imbalances by imposing credit ratios
on increasingly internationalized banks?
On the one hand, one may wish to give the EU authorities more power
to steer euro area macroeconomic developments, either by offering them
the possibility to play a fiscal role, or by organizing automatic transfers
between MS in differing economic situations. On the other hand, this
would require that EU authorities abandon rigid fiscal rules and that they set
themselves the objectives of full employment and the elimination of intra-
zone imbalances. But these are areas where a consensus is very difficult to
reach, meaning that national fiscal policies will have to remain autonomous
for a long time, with the EU authorities having only an advisory role.
National fiscal policies would be facilitated if a European budget
financed investments, and more generally European common goods (such
as fighting against climate change), by using common resources (the
carbon tax and the financial transaction tax) and by issuing Eurobonds. But
this cannot be a pretext for adding constraints on national budgets.
The European institutions believe that they can overcome these prob-
lems by two strategies. On the one hand, the capital markets union is
supposed to improve financial efficiency and play an automatic stabilizing
role, but only if portfolio diversification is sufficient, which is not assured.
On the other hand, structural reforms are expected to contribute to the
convergence of the European countries. However, will these be sufficient
to cope with the divergent trends induced by the polarization of industrial
activities? Moreover, the direction of these reforms would probably benefit
from a more open debate.
Towards which kind of normalisation?
At the time of the EUROFRAME Conference, in June 2018, EU economic
policy was facing two main challenges: monetary policy normalisation and
improving the fiscal policy framework. So far, no advanced country has
succeeded in bringing their economy back to a normal situation, where
real interest rates would be close to long-term output growth and a
primary structural balance close to 0. Central banks are considering a move
to increase their interest rates and to progressively bring non-conventional
policies to an end. Higher interest rates are anticipated, and one may
expect that companies and financial institutions are prepared for this.
Almost all EU countries already run structural primary surpluses. The issue is
more of a macroeconomic order. Will monetary policy normalisation be
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wage policies, which are difficult to coordinate in the EU? The need for an
ecological transition could suggest a new orientation of fiscal and mone-
tary policies, gearing them towards joint support for investments made in
the ecological transition framework. 
More fundamentally, the euro area economic policy framework will
need to be redesigned, by taking into account European choices and
national choices, in terms of monetary policy but also of credit, fiscal
policy, tax policy, and wage policy. Once simplistic solutions, such as a
federal unification under the auspices of the EU institutions or such as the
full autonomy of the national choices have been removed, a painful
compromise will have to be found.
The papers released in this volume address three main topics: fiscal
rules, which remain at the core of fiscal policy debates in the EU, euro area
governance, and bank stability.
Fiscal rules 
Katja Rietzler (Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK) at the Hans-
Boeckler-Foundation, Düsseldorf) and Achim Truger (University of Duis-
burg-Essen, German Council of Economic Experts, Wiesbaden, and IMK),
in “Is the ’Debt Brake’ behind Germany’s successful fiscal consolidation?”,
carry out a comparative analysis of the “structural” consolidation of public
finances in Germany from 1991 to 2017. They show that Germany’s
successful budget consolidation since 2010 is due not to the introduction
of the German debt brake, which serves as a model for the European fiscal
treaty, but to fiscal stimuli, the progressive reduction in transfers to East
Länder, and low interest rates.
Heikki Oksanen (University of Helsinki), in “New output gap estimates
for the euro area and elsewhere”, proposes a simple statistical method for
estimating output gaps: to introduce explicit assumptions about future
growth and to smooth GDP by an HP filter. This method would give results
that are as satisfactory as the more elaborate methods used by interna-
tional organizations (EC, IMF and OECD). The author recognizes, however,
that the output gap estimates remain subject to revisions, which affect the
fiscal effort assessment. Looking at the years 2011-14, the author shows
that an undervaluation of potential growth can be self-fulfilling, leading to
overly restrictive fiscal policies and thus a decline in effective growth.
However, the author argues for transfers between countries based on
differences in output gaps.2
2. A critique of statistical methods to estimate output gaps, as well as of the use of potential
growth for forecasting and for economic policy analysis may be found in: Catherine Mathieu
and Henri Sterdyniak (2015): “Should we still use the concept of potential growth?”, OFCE
Working Paper, 2015/30. 
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Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak (OFCE) in “Euro area macroe-
conomics—where do we stand twenty years later?” recall recent euro area
reform proposals from EU institutions (a convergence and competitiveness
instrument, a fiscal stabilization mechanism at the euro area level) and
from the Member States (more budgetary discipline supervised by markets
or, on the contrary, more solidarity between MS and a euro area budget).
The authors present and discuss the different viewpoints of economists:
those who trust financial markets to control national economic policies,
those who want to strengthen fiscal rules, those who want to improve
existing rules, those who want to organize more or less automatic transfers
between MS, those who want to establish a euro area budget and finance
minister, those who want to move towards a democratized federal Europe,
those who propose original measures to reduce public debts, and finally
those who advocate a better coordination of autonomous fiscal policies in
a Keynesian perspective.
Harmen Lehment (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), in “Fiscal
implications of the ECB’s public sector purchase programme” analyses the
fiscal impacts in terms of the seigniorage gains of the public sector
purchase programme (PSPP), which the ECB started in 2015 for monetary
policy purposes. The author shows that this programme allowed govern-
ments to get funding through banks’ excess reserves, i.e. at a short-term
and entirely safe interest rate instead of selling longer-term bonds at an
interest rate bearing a risk premium. The gain increases as the remunera-
tion on reserves is low and the risk premium is high. In order to
compensate for the future rise in the rate of remuneration of reserves, the
author recommends increasing banks’ reserve requirements and not to
remunerate them. 
Bank stability 
Ilkka Kiema (Labour Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki) and
Esa Jokivuolle (Bank of Finland) in “Bank stability and the European deposit
insurance scheme” analyse the impact of a deposit insurance mechanism,
under the assumption that depositors anticipate the risk that governments
may default, and compare the cost of a guarantee with the cost of a loss in
reputation. From this perspective, the European deposit insurance scheme
would improve bank stability for a limited crisis, but its effects might be
ambiguous in a systemic crisis that affects the whole Banking Union
(increasing the risk of voluntary default by all MS).
